1. The Hard Problem of Consciousness
   1. The Objectivity of the Subjective
   2. Mary in Her Black and White Room
   3. Nagel’s Bat
   4. Zombies
   5. Not Everybody Likes the Hard Problem
   6. Is Consciousness Like Elan Vital?
   7. Is Consciousness an Illusion?
   8. Is Qualophilia a Failure of Imagination?
   9. What Could There Be Besides “Normal” Physics?
2. Goals, Non-Goals, and Ground Rules
   1. Folk Usage vs. Real Definitions
      1. You Can’t Even Define Your Terms!
      2. Is a Hot Dog a Sandwich?
   2. Caricatures of Some Physicalist Arguments
      1. Evolution
      2. Big Dump Truck. Really Big Dump Truck.
      3. Correlation vs. Entailment
   3. Just-Is
   4. Am I Asking Too Much?
   5. Why I Am Optimistic
3. Physicalism: Are We Really Living in a Material World?
   1. There’s No Such Thing as a Purely Physical World
      1. Supervenience
      2. Unimplemented API
      3. Rosenberg’s Game of Life Physics
      4. What’s at the Bottom? Information? Nothing?
   2. Panpsychism? But Doesn’t That Have Huge Problems?
4. Epiphenomenalism: Even If Consciousness Is Real, What Could It Possibly Do?
5. Ned Block’s Turing Test Beater
   1. The Turing Test
   2. Block’s Answer
   3. Is Block Cheating?
6. Can’t We Just Say That Consciousness Depends on the Higher-Level Organization of the System?
   1. Functionalism, Broadly Construed
   2. Black Boxes
   3. Is the Design Inherent in the Implementation?
   4. A Hypothesis about Hypotheticals: Do Counterfactuals Count?
      1. What If We Prune the Untaken Paths?
      2. Integrated Information Theory
   5. Life Is Real. Isn’t It Defined “Merely” Functionally?
   6. What If We Gerrymander the Low-Level Components?
7. Reductionism and Emergence: What Kinds of Things Are There, Really?
   1. Reductionism
      1. Downward Causation
      2. Teleology
   2. Emergence
   3. How Naive Is Our Naive Realism about Our Mid-Level Chunks?
8. The All-At-Onceness of Conscious Experience
   1. Neuron Replacement Therapy
   2. Thoughts Are Evidence of Mid-Level Holism
   3. Functional Organization Can’t Solve Panpsychism’s Combination Problem
   4. Quantum Mechanics
      1. “Random” Is a Big Tent
   5. But Back to NRT
9. Time Consciousness and the Specious Present
   1. My Notion of Motion
   2. Extentionalism
   3. Retentionalism
      1. Time-Quale?
   4. Time to Bite Another Metaphysical Bullet?
10. Free Will
    1. Two Cheers for Compatibilism
    2. What Even Is Free Will?
    3. Thwarted Free Will Is Still Willful
    4. How Invasive Is the World?
    5. Free Will Is Inherently Creative
    6. Free Will Is Constitutive of Self and Not Necessarily Non-Deterministic
    7. Free Will Is for Partless Wholes
    8. Do Large Partless Wholes Obey Laws?
       1. Does Anything Obey Laws?
       2. How Do the Big Things Interact with the Small Things?
    9. Who (or What) Would Possess Free Will?
       1. How Many? How Long-Lived?
11. How Panpsychism Might Work
    1. The Combination Problem
    2. Particle Man
    3. Quantum Holism and Chaos
    4. Holism and Its Discontents
12. Pandemonium!
    1. Daniel Dennett
    2. The Infinite Regress of the Cartesian Theater
    3. Dennett’s Pandemonium
       1. The Center of Narrative Gravity
    4. What Pandemonium Gets Wrong or Leaves Out
       1. How Many Demons Are There?
    5. Darwinian Memosphere of Demons
       1. Broad and Narrow Niches
    6. The Spotlight of Attention
    7. Synthesis/Analysis Feedback Loop
    8. Background Demons
       1. Antimemes
       2. Epistemically Hungry Agencies
    9. Fine, but What about Consciousness?
       1. Strangely Swimming Conscious Demons
    10. The Players Are the Audience
    11. The Self
        1. Self as Status Register
        2. Do Qualia Beg the Self Question?
    12. Holism—The Real Sticking Point
13. Cognitive Qualia
    1. My Phenomenal Twin
    2. The Qualia of Thought
    3. Naive, or Pure Experience
       1. Dennett on “Direct” Perception vs. Judgment
    4. Naive, or Pure Cognition
14. Doesn’t It All Just Come down to Information?
    1. What Even Is Information, Anyway?
    2. Information Is a Platonic Abstraction
    3. Information Represents
    4. Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Information
       1. Example Using Boolean AND
    5. Information Pokes, Pushes, or Nudges
       1. Self-Reference
    6. All Models Are Algorithms
       1. Internal Models as Black Boxes
    7. The Algorithmic Intuition
    8. The Data Intuition
    9. What Is It Like to Know?
    10. Descriptive Information Is a Projection, and Weird
15. Reference: Picking Out
    1. Extension, Intension, and Possible Worlds
       1. Who Is “Albert Einstein”?
    2. Putnam’s Twin Earth
    3. Saul Kripke
       1. Hesperus and Phosphorus
    4. Modes of Presentation
    5. The Contents of Our Thoughts
    6. Picking Out, Functionally
    7. Being Scientifically Correct vs. Being Linguistically Correct
    8. Putting Meaning Back in the Head
16. Reference: Turning Out
    1. Two-Dimensional Semantics
    2. Turning Out
    3. Symbol Resolution
    4. Early vs. Late Binding
    5. Haters Gonna Hate: Some Tautologies
    6. How Should We Think about Reference?
17. Reference Internalized
    1. The Reality Between Our Ears
    2. It’s Often Wrong
    3. It’s Mostly Holes
    4. We Take Our Model with a Grain of Salt
    5. Internalism Isn’t Right, Exactly, Except It Kind of Is
18. Conclusion
    1. Basic Metaphysics
       1. Taking Qualia Seriously
       2. Holism
       3. Time
       4. Structure and Relation, Phenomenologized
    2. My Favorite Model: Pandemonium
    3. My Teeth Hurt
19. References
20. About the Author